M&C編集部・蓬田修一
2026/9/22

今、中国の経済は不動産価格の下落、若者の失業者の増加、外国資本の撤退などがあり、また欧米からの圧力や、日本を含む 諸外国のサプライチェーンの変化により、大きく落ち込んでいる。

ここでは改めて、中国が実現させた経済成長を少しだけ振り返って、考察を進めたい。

中国経済が大きく伸びていた時期、北京や上海 といった大都市 だけでなく、中国中の都市が大型 建設プロジェクトを行い、活況を呈していた。

ここで大きな役割を果たしていたのが 、中国独自の融資プラットフォーム、いわゆる融資平台だった。

融資平台とはどういううものか、融資平台を活用してどのように経済を拡大させていったのか その仕組みを解説する。

中国の経済成長を支えた「融資平台」の仕組み

中国経済を振り返ると、2000年代から2010年代にかけて、北京や上海だけでなく、地方都市や内陸部まで大規模な道路、鉄道、住宅、工業団地、上下水道などが次々と建設された。

その背後で大きな役割を果たしたのが、「地方政府融資平台」、いわゆる「融資平台(LGFV; Local government financing vehicle)」である。

融資平台とは、地方政府が出資・管理する国有企業などを通じて、銀行から融資を受けたり、債券を発行したりする仕組みである。

法律上は企業であるため、地方政府が直接借金をする場合とは異なる形で資金を調達できた。IMFも融資平台は特に2008年の世界金融危機以降、地方のインフラ投資を支える重要な資金調達手段となったと指摘している。

なぜ「融資平台」が出現したか

大きな背景には、1994年の税制改革がある。中央政府と地方政府の税収配分が変更され、地方政府は行政、都市開発、インフラ整備など多くの支出責任を負い、十分な税収を確保しにくい構造になった。

一方、中国では長く地方政府が自由に借金することが制限されていた。そこで地方政府は、自らが出資する融資平台を設立し、そこに土地などの資産を移して担保とし、銀行などから資金を調達した。

という流れをつくったのだ。

重要なのが「土地使用権」

中国の地方政府は、都市開発を進める際、土地を開発し、土地使用権を企業や不動産開発会社などに売却することで収入を得てきた。

インフラを整備すれば、その周辺の土地の価値が上昇しやすくなる。上昇した土地の使用権を売れば収入が得られ、その収入をさらにインフラ整備に回すことができる。

という循環が成立したのである。

IMFや世界銀行も、中国の地方財政において土地開発とインフラ投資が強く結びついていたことを指摘している。

2008年の世界金融危機

2008年のサブプライムローン問題がきっかけとなり、世界金融危機となった。中国も輸出が落ち込むなか、中国政府は大規模な景気刺激策を実施した。2008年末に打ち出された4兆元規模の景気刺激策では、地方政府にも大きな投資が求められた。

しかし地方政府には十分な財源がなかった。そこで、融資平台を設立し借入を急増させた。IMFによれば、2008~10年に地方政府関連債務は急速に増加し、銀行融資を通じた融資平台の資金調達がその大きな部分を占めた。

金融エンジン

この仕組みには、非常に大きな経済的効果があった。

道路や鉄道が整備されれば物流が改善する。工業団地ができれば企業が進出する。住宅や商業施設が建設されれば雇用が生まれる。都市人口が増えれば消費も拡大する。そして、建設会社、鉄鋼、セメント、機械、金融、不動産など、非常に多くの産業が動く。

つまり融資平台は単なる「地方政府の借金の道具」ではなく、中国の都市化とインフラ建設を一気に進めるための金融エンジンとして機能したのである。

しかし、ここに現在の中国経済が抱える問題の一つがある。

この成長モデルは、将来の経済成長や土地価格の上昇を前提としていた。ところが不動産市場が減速し、土地価格や土地使用権の売却収入が伸びなくなると、地方政府の収入も減少する。一方で、過去に積み上げた融資平台の債務は残る。その結果、

という逆方向の循環が生じた。

中国経済成長の基盤ではあった

もっとも、融資平台を最初から失敗した仕組みと考えるのも適切ではない。

この仕組みを通じて中国は巨大なインフラを短期間で整備し、都市化と産業化を進めた。その成果は現在の中国経済の基盤にもなっている。

問題は、「融資平台によって成長する段階」から「融資平台以外の力によって成長する段階」へ、どのように移行するかである。

中国経済が現在直面している課題は、単純な景気後退ではない。近年の軽税成長を支えてきた金融・不動産・地方財政の仕組みを、どのように次の段階へ転換できるかという構造的な問題である。

わたしの考えでは、習近平では無理であろう。次の指導者が誰になるのか不明だが(4人に絞られたようだ)、彼らにもできるかどうかは怪しい。

その根拠については、別の記事で書きたい。

In English;

The Financing Platforms That Supported China’s Economic Growth

Today, China’s economy is facing a number of serious challenges, including falling property prices, rising youth unemployment, and declining foreign investment. In addition, pressure from Europe and the United States, as well as changes in global supply chains involving Japan and other countries, have affected the Chinese economy.

In this article, I would like to look back briefly at the economic growth China achieved and consider one of the mechanisms that played an important role in that growth.

During the period of rapid economic expansion, large-scale construction projects were underway not only in major cities such as Beijing and Shanghai, but also in cities throughout China.

One of the important mechanisms behind this construction boom was China’s unique system of financing platforms, commonly known as rongzi pingtai (融资平台).

So, what exactly were these financing platforms, and how did they contribute to China’s economic expansion?

The mechanism of the “financing platforms” that supported China’s economic growth

Looking back at China’s economic development, particularly from the 2000s through the 2010s, large-scale roads, railways, housing developments, industrial parks, water and sewage systems, and other infrastructure projects were constructed not only in major cities but also in regional and inland areas.

Behind much of this investment were what are known as Local Government Financing Vehicles (LGFVs).

LGFVs are companies, often owned or controlled by local governments, that raise funds through bank loans and bond issuance.

Because these entities were legally structured as companies rather than as local governments themselves, they could obtain financing in a different form from direct borrowing by local governments. The International Monetary Fund has noted that LGFVs became an important source of financing for local infrastructure investment, particularly after the global financial crisis of 2008.

Why did the financing platforms emerge?

One important background factor was China’s 1994 tax reform.

The reform changed the distribution of tax revenues between the central and local governments. Local governments were left with substantial responsibilities for public administration, urban development, infrastructure, and other expenditures, while finding it difficult to secure sufficient tax revenue.

At the same time, local governments in China were subject to restrictions on borrowing directly.

As a result, local governments established financing vehicles under their control, transferred assets such as land to these entities, and used those assets to help secure financing from banks and other financial institutions.

The basic flow was:

Local government →
LGFV →
Bank borrowing →
Investment in roads, railways, housing, industrial parks, and other projects

This became an important mechanism for financing local development.

The importance of land-use rights

Another key element was land.

As Chinese local governments promoted urban development, they generated revenue by developing land and selling land-use rights to companies and real-estate developers.

Infrastructure development could increase the value of land in surrounding areas. Once land values rose, local governments could sell the corresponding land-use rights and obtain additional revenue, which could then be used for further infrastructure investment.

In this way, a cycle was created:

Borrow money to build infrastructure →
Cities develop →
Land values rise →
Sell land-use rights →
Generate revenue →
Invest again

The IMF and World Bank have both pointed to the close relationship between land development and infrastructure investment in China’s local public finances.

The global financial crisis of 2008

The global financial crisis, triggered by the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States, had a major impact on China as well.

As Chinese exports declined, the Chinese government introduced a large-scale economic stimulus program. In late 2008, Beijing announced a stimulus package of around four trillion yuan, and local governments were expected to undertake substantial investment.

However, local governments did not have sufficient financial resources to fund all of these projects directly.

They therefore made extensive use of LGFVs, and borrowing through these entities increased rapidly. According to the IMF, local-government-related debt grew sharply between 2008 and 2010, with bank financing obtained through LGFVs accounting for a significant portion of this increase.

A financial engine for economic growth

This system had a very significant economic effect.

When roads and railways were built, logistics improved. When industrial parks were developed, companies moved in. When housing and commercial facilities were constructed, employment was created. As urban populations grew, consumption also expanded.

At the same time, a wide range of industries became active, including construction, steel, cement, machinery, finance, and real estate.

In this sense, LGFVs were not simply a means for local governments to accumulate debt. They functioned as a financial engine that accelerated China’s urbanization and infrastructure development.

However, this is also where one of the problems facing the Chinese economy today can be found.

The reverse cycle

This model of economic growth depended, to a considerable extent, on expectations of continued economic expansion and rising land values.

When the real-estate market began to slow and revenue from land-use-right sales declined, local-government revenues also came under pressure.

At the same time, the debt accumulated through LGFVs did not simply disappear.

As a result, a reverse cycle could emerge:

Weak real-estate market →
Declining land-related revenue →
Deteriorating local-government finances →
Increasing difficulty in servicing LGFV debt →
Slower investment and construction

This is one of the structural problems that China now faces.

LGFVs were also a foundation of China’s economic growth

It would nevertheless be inappropriate to regard LGFVs as a failed system from the outset.

Through this mechanism, China was able to build enormous amounts of infrastructure in a relatively short period of time and accelerate urbanization and industrialization.

The infrastructure created during this period remains an important foundation of the Chinese economy today.

The fundamental question is therefore how China can move from a stage of growth driven heavily by LGFVs and large-scale investment to a stage in which economic growth is supported by other sources of demand and productivity.

The challenge facing the Chinese economy today is not simply an ordinary economic slowdown. Rather, it is a structural challenge: how to transform the financial, real-estate, and local-government system that supported China’s rapid growth for many years and move it toward a new stage of development.

In my view, I am doubtful that Xi Jinping will be able to accomplish this transformation. It is still unclear who the next leader will be, although there appear to be four leading possibilities. Whether any of them will be able to carry out such a transformation is also uncertain.

I would like to discuss the reasons for this view in another article.